The Existence Of Implied Private Rights
Of Action Under Section 17(A) Of The
1933 Securities Act by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 3 Article 15
Summer 6-1-1982
The Existence Of Implied Private Rights Of Action
Under Section 17(A) Of The 1933 Securities Act
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Existence Of Implied Private Rights Of Action Under Section 17(A) Of The 1933 Securities Act, 39
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1982), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol39/iss3/15
THE EXISTENCE OF IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS
OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 17(a) OF THE
1933 SECURITIES ACT
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)' to deter and
protect the public from fraudulent practices in the securities markets.!
Section 17(a) of the '33 Act prohibits fraud in the offer or sale of any
security.3 The Securities and Exchange Commission enforces section
17(a) violations by means of criminal prosecutions or injunctions.' Con-
gress, however, failed to legislate an express private cause of action in
section 17(a).1 The '33 Act specifically provides two civil enforcement sec-
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940) (purpose of statute to pr--vent
fraud in securities markets); H.R. REP. No. 1388, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1940); S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). Courts and commentators agree that the federal
securities laws attempt to protect investors from fraud. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1979) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940.protects
investors from fraud); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 776 (1979) (purpose of
Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) to protect investors and securities market operations from
fraud); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act) prohibits fraudulent practices to protect securities investors). See generally
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as Douglas]; Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Place for a
Private Right, 68 Nw. L. REv. 44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Horton]; Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 214 (1959).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) of the '33 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976); see Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1952)
(SEC enforcement of § 17(a) violations to protect public against fraud in sale of securities),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1953); SEC v. Northeastern Financial Corp., 268 F. Supp. 412, 417
(D.N.J. 1967) (injunctive relief for protection of investing public rather than punishment of
wrongdoer by government).
' See note 3, supra; L. Loss, 3 SECURITIES REGULATION 1785 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss] (describing enforcement schemes of '33 and '34 Acts); Douglas, supra note 1,
at 181 (section 17(a) does not expand civil remedies of purchasers provided under §§ 11 and
12). The '33 Act provides for civil, criminal, and injunctive relief. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1976) (civil liabilities for false registration statement); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) (civil liabilities
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tions that do not apply to all circumstances under which section 17(a)
liability arises.6 Consequently, courts have faced the question of whether
section 17(a) implies a private right of action.7 Recent Supreme Court
decisions have not settled the conflicting district and circuit court con-
in connection with prospectuses and communications); 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976) (injunctions and
prosecution of offenses). The '33 Act has two specific enforcement provisions providing civil
liabilities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k & 771 (1976); Loss, supra, at 1785. Section 12(2) provides a civil
remedy when § 17(a) is violated. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976); see Loss, supra, at 1785. Section 11
provides a remedy for § 5 as well as § 17(a). 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). The remedies afforded by
§§ 11 and 12 are not complete, but §§ 11 and 12 embrace all of the substantive rights created
by §§ 17(a) and 5. See Loss, supra, at 1785; notes 6 and 173 infra (requirements of enforce-
ment section of '33 Act may not allow enforcement for all § 17(a) violations).
' See Loss, supra note 5, at 1785. Section 17(a) provides no specific enforcement provis-
ion, but relies on §§ 11 and 12(2) for civil remedies. See id.; note 5 supra. Section 11 grants a
private cause of action to a purchaser of securities who relied on a material misstatement or
omission in an effective registration statement in making the purchase. 15 U.S.C. §
77k(a)(1)-(5) (1976). All participants except the issuer may escape liability by a showing of
due diligence, reasonable investigation, or reliance on experts. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) 1-3 (1976)
(no person other than issuer shall be liable who shall sustain burden of proof that he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at time
registration statement became effective, that statements therein were true); see Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 576-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (directors of
corporation held to reasonable investigation standard in tender offer registration state-
ment); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (directors,
underwriters, auditor and house counsel held to standard of due diligence); Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(1969) (ramifications of reliance on expert or nonexpert statements). Section 12(2) provides a
remedy for rescission or damages on behalf of a purchaser when a seller makes material
misstatements in the offer or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Section 12(2) im-
poses liability for negligent misconduct, requires privity between the defendant and pur-
chaser, provides a defense of reasonable care, places the burden of proof on the defendant,
and applies only to seller misconduct in the initial distribution of securities. Id.; see
Steinberg, Section 17(a of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEo.
L.J. 163, 178-79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as '33 Act After Naftalin and Redington]. Section
17(a), on the other hand, applies only to fraudulent practices in the initial distribution and
market trading of securities. Id. Furthermore, § 17(a) has no requirement of privity and
places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Id. The requirements of § 12(2) can place the en-
forcement provisions of the '33 Act beyond the scope of § 17(a). Thus, even though § 12 acts
as the enforcement provision for § 17(a), significant gaps exist in the structure of the
legislated remedy. See id.
' See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir.) (language of § 17(a) broad
enough to infer private right of action), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1978); SEC v. Coven, 581
F.2d 1020, 1027 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978) (inference of § 17(a) private right of action is open ques-
tion), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159
(8th Cir. 1977) (section 17(a) does not give private right of action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (section 17(a) supports private
damage claim); Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060, 1069 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (sec-
tion 17(a) does not create civil damage claim for violation); Campito v. McManus, Longe,
Brockwehl, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 986, 993 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (recognized implied right of action
under § 17(a)); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.P.R. 1978)
(recognized First Circuit's sub silentio inference of a § 17(a) cause of action); DeMarco v.
Security Planning Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1978) (private civil action for
damages lies for § 17(a) violation).
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clusions concerning judicial inference of a private right of action under
section 17(a) of the '33 Act.' In the last ten years, however, the Supreme
Court has dictated varying guidelines and considerations for the proper
inference of private rights of action.' Recent cases reflect the Court's
movement toward a very restrictive federal doctrine governing the
judicial inference of private remedies. 0 The question thus remains
whether a court, in light of recent restrictive Supreme Court decisions,
properly can find an implied section 17(a) private cause of action.
Prior to 1974, the Supreme Court liberally applied the federal doc-
* See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980) (Supreme Court has not addressed ques-
tion whether private cause of action exists under § 17(a)); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979) (expressing no view on judicial inference of § 17(a)
private remedy); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 n.6 (1975)
(reserving consideration of inference of § 17(a) cause of action). Compare Stephenson v.
Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,249, 91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (in-
ferring § 17(a) cause of action) and Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,267, 91,717 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (inferring cause of action under § 17(a)) and
Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daffy Income, Inc., [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,254, 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (inferring § 17(a) private remedy) with Goodweather
v. Thompson & McKinnon, Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,352, 92,187 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (no implied remedy under § 17(a)); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp.
1370, 1376 (D. Del. 1981) (no private remedy under § 17(a)).
O See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (ex-
amine language of statute, legislative history, purpose, structure and congressional intent
to supplement state remedies); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981) (same);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981) (determine congressional
intent through examination of language and focus of statute, legislative history and pur-
pose); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17-24 (1979) (congressional in-
tent determinative); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (same); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (same); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
688-94 (1979) (same); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (determine
legislative purpose and necessity of implied remedy to effectuate purpose); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (consider whether statute creates right in plaintiffs favor, legislature in-
tends to create remedy, private remedy fulfills purpose of legislative scheme, and basis of
claim is state rather than federal concern); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (court should not infer remedy expanding ex-
press statutory remedies); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (court has com-
mon law power to create remedies for enforcement of statutory right). See also Texas &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1917) (initiation of federal implication doctrine
creating remedy whenever right exists).
10 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (no
implied private cause of action); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981) (same);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981) (denying inference of
private remedy); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (same); Note, Implied Rights of
Action: Transamerica Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 21 B.C. L. REV. 1143, 1152 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Implied Rights of Action] (recent decisions severely limit future inference of im-
plied rights); Note, Implied Private Causes of Action Under the Investment Advisers Act,
94 HARv. L. REV. 279, 285 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Private Causes of Action] (principle ap-
plied in recent cases leaves almost no room for recognition of implied private rights of ac-
tion). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-94 (1979) (inference of
private remedy in Title IX sex discrimination case).
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trine of implied private rights of action by creating private remedies
that would effectuate federal statutory purposes.1 In 1974, however, the
Supreme Court initiated a trend toward limitation of the Court's prior
" See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). The Supreme Court initiated the federal doctrine of im-
plied private rights of action in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby. 241 U.S. at 39-40. In Rigsby,
the Court found that an employee of a railroad company had a cause of action for damages
sustained because of a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act (Safety Act). Id. at
37-38; see 27 Stat. 531, c. 196 (1893) as amended, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976 (1903). The Court found
that Congress intended the Safety Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers.
241 U.S. at 39. The plaintiff sustained personal injuries while performing duties as defendant's
employee. Id. at 36. The plaintiff's injuries resulted from faulty equipment on defendant's
railroad car which violated the Safety Act. Id. at 36-37. The Court found that the Act's
language was broad enough to include all employees irrespective of interstate commerce
power limitations. Id. at 39. The Rigsby Court concluded that because the statute created a
right in favor of the plaintiff, the Court should infer a remedy for that right. Id. at 3940.
The Court stated that whenever a statute prohibits an activity for the "especial benefit" of
a class of persons, the common law allows a court to fashion a remedy under the statute for
the benefit of the injured class member. Id. The Rigsby decision was the Supreme Court's
first step toward establishing criteria for the inference of private rights. Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 555 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]. The Court has
recognized judicial power to enforce the rights created by the legislature even in the
absence of an express statutory remedy. Id.; see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430
(1964).
In J. . Case Co. v. Borak, a shareholder contested a merger on the grounds that SEC
approval resulted from the use of misleading proxy statements. 377 U.S. at 427. The plain-
tiff alleged violations of § 14(a) of the '34 Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (prohibiting
non-complying proxies). The Court recognized the inherent judicial power to create common
law remedies for statutory violations. 377 U.S. at 430. Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the broad remedial purposes of § 14(a) of the '34 Act and the intent of the statute to
protect investors implied the availability of judicial relief. Id. at 431-32; cf. Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (section 17 creates no cause of action of own force
and effect). The Court further reasoned that an inferred remedy not only would provide a
necessary supplement to SEC enforcement activities, but also would help effectuate the
protective purpose of the statute. 377 U.S. at 432.
The Borak decision reaffirmed the concept initiated in the early case of Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) that the judiciary has the power to create
remedies for the enforcement of statutory rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(federal judiciary chooses traditionally available judicial remedies according to substantive
social policy of statute); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(judicial function to interpret congressional enactments to determine how to enforce
statute). Decisions following Rigsby focused on the plaintiffs right to compensation for
violation of a statute. See Frankel, supra, at 555-56 (indicating traditional compensation ra-
tionale). The emphasis of the Borak Court, however, was on deterrence. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
The Court created a cause of action to serve the public purpose of deterring securities viola-
tions. Id. Thus, the Borak court instituted the "private attorneys general" concept for the
enforcement of the '34 Act. Id.; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 736 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (Borak held that private enforcement provides necessary supplement
to SEC action). Under the Borak rationale, a court will award damages to the plaintiff, ac-
ting as a private attorney general, as a public service award for deterring securities viola-
tions. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
1152 [Vol. 39:1149
SECTION 17(a) IMPLIED ACTIONS
expansive implication doctrine. 2 In Cort v. Ash," the Court established a
restrictive four-part test for the inference of private rights of action. In
Cort, a corporate stockholder argued for the inference of a private right
of action under a criminal statute forbidding corporate contributions or
expenditures in connection with certain elections.' The Court concluded
that neither the legislative history nor the purpose of the statute allowed
the finding of an implied private right of action.'" In denying the in-
ference of a private cause of action, the Court enumerated four prin-
ciples for the determination of whether a private right is implicit in a
statute.'8 First, a court must determine if the statute creates a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff by asking whether the plaintiff is a member
of the class that especially benefits from the statute.' Second, a court
should investigate the legislative history to determine the existence of
1 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak),
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers (Amtrak), the plaintiff complained that the discontinuance of certain train
routes was a violation of § 404(a) of the Amtrak Act. Id. at 455; see 45 U.S.C. § 564(a) (1976).
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Amtrak Act provided a private
remedy for violation of duties created by the Act. 414 U.S. at 456. The Court held that the
plaintiff did not have a private right of action under the statute. Id. at 457; see 45 U.S.C. §
561 (1976). The Court rejected the old principle of "where there is a right there is a remedy"
and instead relied upon the ancient maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Id. at
457-58. The expressio principle provides that when legislation expressly dictates a remedy,
a court should not expand'the coverage of the statute to include other remedies. Id. at 458;
see Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929) (statutory limitation of activity in-
cludes negative of any other mode). The Amtrak court used the expressio maxim to find
that, absent a showing of contrary legislative intent, the limited nature of the remedies pro-
vided by § 307(a) of the Amtrak Act compelled the conclusion that the express remedies
were the exclusive means of enforcing the duties of the Act. 414 U.S. at 457. The Court
found that when Congress creates a remedy a court can expand or augment that remedy only
upon a showing of legislative intent supporting an addition to the statutory scheme. Id. at
457-58.
I, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
" Id. at 68-69; see Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (repealed 1976) (prohibiting
corporate contributions or expenditures in connection with election involving voting for
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors).
22 422 U.S. at 69.
"Id. at 78.
1 Id.; see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (plaintiff must be one
of class for whose especial benefit legislature enacted statute); note 11 supra (discussion of
Rigsby). In Cort, the Court noted that if a plaintiff is the primary beneficiary of the statute,
he need not show express legislative intent to create a cause of action. 422 U.S. at 82. An ex-
plicit legislative intent to deny a cause of action, however, is controlling. Id.; see Implied
Rights of Action, supra note 10, at 1158-59. The Cort case concerned the violation of a
criminal statute. See Act of June 25, 1848, c. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (repealed 1976). The Court
found that the criminal statute did not concern the internal relations between corporations
and stockholders and gave no indication of the availability of civil enforcement. 422 U.S. at
80-82. The Court explicitly rejected the concept that a criminal statute can never create a
special group of protected individuals. Id. at 80. The criminal statute in Cort, however, did
not create a special group of protected stockholders. Id. Therefore, the Court held that the
statute created no clearly articulated right in the plaintiff. Id. at 82.
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explicit or implicit congressional intent to create or deny a remedy.18
Third, a court should examine the legislative scheme to determine
whether the inference of a remedy is consistent with the primary
statutory purpose.19 Finally, a court must ascertain whether the cause of
action is one traditionally within the concern of the states." If the action
falls within a state's sphere of influence, the finding of a cause of action
based solely on federal law is inappropriate." The Court recognized
other factors that courts should consider in conjunction with application
of the four basic principles. First, a clearly articulated federal right in
favor of the plaintiff should exist to construe a private remedy.22 In the
case where no clear right exists, a pervasive legislative scheme control-
ling the activities of both plaintiff and defendant classes will allow the in-
ference of a remedy." Second, plaintiff's failure to prove congressional
intent to create a remedy will not prevent the finding of an implied
remedy where federal law clearly gives the plaintiff substantive rights.24
However, an express congressional intent to deny a remedy controls.,
Third, state law will govern corporate disputes except when federal law
governs the duties that directors owe to shareholders.8
In decisions subsequent to Cort, the Supreme Court has
generally applied the four-part Cort test to deny the existence
of implied private rights of action.' In Cannon v. University of
" 422 U.S. at 78; see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (general principles of statutory construction must yield
to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent).
19 422 U.S. at 78.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 84.
Id. at 82; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1974) (clearly articulated federal right in plaintiff to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure carried out by virtue of federal authority).
1 422 U.S. at 82; see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (pervasive
legislative scene regulating conduct of plaintiff and defendant classes).
2, 422 U.S. at 82-84.
' Id. at 82.
26 Id. at 84-85; see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964) ('34 Act requires
federal, rather than state, enforcement because federally created rights under statute).
See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (Court applied Cort in denying
private right of action under Trade Secrets Act); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 61 (1978) (Cort analysis used to find no private remedy under Indian Civil Rights Act);
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977). In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
the Supreme Court examined the relevant statute and found no express language creating a
private remedy. 430 U.S. at 24; accord, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688
(1979). The Piper court next considered, as a general proposition, whether the inference of a
private remedy was necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose underlying the
statute. 430 U.S. at 25-26. The Court subsequently employed the Cort analysis to deny the
finding of an implied private right of action. Id. at 38-41. The preliminary inquiry concerning
the necessity of inferring a remedy was distinct from the third Cort principle concerning
consistency with the underlying purpose of the statute. Id. at 26; see Steinberg, Implied
Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 49 (1979)
1154 [Vol. 39:1149
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Chicago,' however, the Court found an implied right of action,' and
recognized several considerations to supplement the Cort test prin-
ciples." Under the second Cort principle, the Cannon Court recognized
that ambiguous or silent legislative history does not preclude the finding
of an implied remedy, although an explicit showing of intent to deny a
remedy would control. In the consideration of the third Cort principle,
the Cannon Court noted that the Court is receptive to the inference of a
remedy that is necessary or beneficial to fulfillment of the statutory pur-
pose.2 Finally, the Court indicated that the existence of express
statutory remedies does not necessarily foreclose the inference of ap-
propriate remedies under a separate section.' The most significant
aspect of the Cannon decision, however, is the Court's emphasis on the
determination of congressional intent. 4 The Court stated that the ques-
tion of the existence of a private right of action is one of statutory con-
struction. 5 The Court applied and analyzed the four Cort factors as a
means to determine the intent of Congress to create a private remedy
for a special class of litigants. 6 The Court indicated that only under cer-
tain limited circumstances would congressional failure to create an ex-
press cause of action permit the inference of a private remedy. In Can-
non, the Court found sufficient congressional intent to imply a remedy
[hereinafter cited as Steinberg]. In International Bhd of Teamsters v. Daniel, however, the
Court declined to address the issue of whether Cort is the proper analysis for the implica-
tion inquiry for § 17(a) of the '33 Act. 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979). The Daniel Court found
that the Securities Act did not cover the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 570. Thus, the Court ex-
pressed no views concerning the propriety of a § 17(a) private remedy. Id. at 557 n.9.
441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the plaintiff claimed sex
discrimination in the admissions practices of several medical schools in violation of Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 680-83; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Title IX).
Plaintiff further asserted that Title IX allowed a private cause of action for one in the plain-
tiffs class. 441 U.S. at 680-84.
441 U.S. at 717.
Id. at 694-711; Steinberg, supra note 27, at 37.
31 441 U.S. at 694.
3 Id. at 703. The Cannon Court's use of the terms "necessary" or "beneficial to fulfill-
ment" in reference to statutory purpose highlights a notable distinction that arose subse-
quent to the Cort and Piper decisions. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S 1, 25-26
(1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 'J.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Cort, the third principle used by the Supreme
Court requires consistency between the implied remedy and the primary statutory purpose.
422 U.S. at 78; Implied Rights of Action, supra note 10, at 1159. Piper, on the other hand,
established a stricter standard for the inference of a remedy. 420 U.S. at 25-26. The Piper
standard allowed a remedy only if necessary to implementation of congressional purpose.
Id. The Cannon standard of "necessary" or "beneficial" indicates an easing of the Piper
standards. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 703.
1 441 U.S. at 711; see text accompanying notes 72-79 infra (expressio principle
forecloses implication of remedies when statute provides express remedies).
3 Frankel, supra note 11, at 560.
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only because the implied remedy satisfied all the principles of the Cort
test. 8 The Court recognized that the absence of an express remedy is
consistent with congressional intent to allow an available remedy only
when the implied remedy passes the four-part Cort test. 9
The Cannon dissenters were even more restrictive than the majority
in their interpretation of the relevance of the Cort test to the implication
inquiry." The dissenters suggested that the Cort factors are mere
guidelines to the determination of whether Congress intended to pro-
vide a private cause of action.' Justice Powell indicated that only one
Cort factor expressly refers to legislative intent.2 The remaining
segments of the Cort analysis deflect a court's focus away from inquiry
into congressional intent to independent judicial lawmaking." The
substitution of judicial opinion for congressional legislation violates the
separation of powers doctrine and denigrates the democratic process."
Justice Powell indicated, therefore, that the Court should refuse to find
private remedies absent compelling evidence that Congress intended the
existence of a remedy." The subsequent Supreme Court decision of
Touche Ross Co. v. Redington" reflected the views found in Justice
Powell's Cannon dissent. 7
In Redington, the Court reemphasized the role of congressional in-
tent as the sole consideration in deciding upon the existence of an im-
plied right of action." The Court significantly altered the Cort test,"
however, thereby limiting the federal implication doctrine. The Supreme
See id.
3 See id.
40 Id. at 688-717; 441 U.S. at 718, 725-30 (White, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting); 441
U.S. at 730, 742-49 (Powell, J., dissenting); Frankel, supra note 11, at 561.
4 See 441 U.S. at 718-19, 740 (White, J., Blackmun, J., and Powell, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). The second Cort factor concerns congressional in-
tent. 422 U.S. at 78.
" 441 U.S. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Justice Powell's Cannon dissent, he
argued that the Cort four factor analysis is not faithful to the principles found in article III
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 743; see U.S. CONST. art. III. Justice Powell
asserted that the judicial implication of remedies allows a court of limited jurisdiction to ex-
tend its authority without congressional authorization. 441 U.S. at 746. Justice Powell em-
phasized that while article III gives Congress the authority to limit federal court jurisdic-
tion, implication of a private remedy allows the federal judiciary to set the limits of jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 746. But see Steinberg, supra note 27, at 40-41 (indicating extreme nature of
Justice Powell's Cannon dissent).
" 441 U.S. at 745-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 749.
:8 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
' Id. at 568-75; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Frankel, supra note 11, at 561.
's 442 U.S. at 568; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (existence of private right of action is question of statutory con-
struction).
" Compare Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 568-79 with Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 174.
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Court rejected the concept that each of the four Cort principles were of
equal weight." Instead, the Court indicated that the first three Cort fac-
tors are the relevant indicia in determining whether Congress intended
to provide a private remedy. 1 The Court found that the statute granted
no private rights to an identifiable class nor proscribed any conduct as
unlawful.5 Furthermore, the Court noted that the legislative history did
not reveal a congressional intent to create a remedy. The Court con-
cluded from an analysis of only the first two Cort factors that Congress
did not intend to imply a private remedy.54 Therefore, the Redington
Court declined to address the third and fourth Cort factors because of
the clear absence of the requisite congressional intent.5 Although the
Supreme Court indicated the importance of a three part Cort analysis,
the Court relied only on the first two Cort factors to deny the existence
of an implied private remedy in section 17(a) of the '34 Act. 6
442 U.S. at 575.
, Id. The Redington Court changed the Cort analysis from a four-part test that con-
sisted of equally weighted factors. Id.; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The modified
Cort test adopted in Redington consists of a two-tier inquiry. 442 U.S. at 575. The first level
is primarily a determination of legislative intent. Id. The second level consists of an analysis
of whether federal or state concerns control the issue. Id. Since the Court did not reach a
positive conclusion on the first level of inquiry, the Court did not proceed to the second level
of analysis. Id.
Id. at 576; see 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
442 U.S. at 571, 576; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13, 21 (1934); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1934) (indicating § 17(a) of '34 Act does not provide
remedies to customers for losses after liquidation).
u 442 U.S. at 575-76.
442 U.S. at 576; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (third and fourth Cort factors
concern underlying legislative purpose and state sovereignty considerations).
1, 442 U.S. at 576. One commentator has interpreted the Redington decision as
establishing a three-prong test for the judicial inference of a private remedy. Steinberg,
supra note 27, at 42-43. Under the three-prong test, if the plaintiff fails to show that he is a
primary beneficiary or that the statute proscribed the disputed conduct, and the legislative
history is silent, the court concludes that Congress did not intend a private remedy under
the statute. Id. Once the three-prong inquiry shows a lack of congressional intent to create a
private remedy, a court need not proceed further with the implication analysis. Id. The
third and fourth Cort factors are relevant under the three-prong test only if the plaintiff
first satisfies at least one of the prerequisites of the test. Id. When legislative history is am-
biguous, the Court requires a clear showing that Congress granted a party in the plaintiff's
position certain rights. Id. at 43. If the plaintiff has identifiable rights, the Court may infer a
private remedy when the remedy meets the requirements of the third and fourth Cort prin-
ciples. Id. When the plaintiff is within the special class protected by the statute or the
statute prohibits the defendant's conduct, the Court assumes a congressional intent to give
the plaintiff rights and can infer a private cause of action to uphold those rights. Id.; see
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979) (Supreme Court has never
refused to imply cause of action when language of statute explicitly conferred a right directly
on class of persons including plaintiff). If the plaintiff does not satisfy the three-part inquiry,
however, the implication analysis is at an end. 442 U.S. at 575-76.
The Redington modification of the four-part implication test developed in Cort is
somewhat similar to elements of the pre-Cort implication doctrine. See note 11 supra. The
Redington Court may allow the inference of a private cause of action if Congress gave the
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The Redington Court introduced additional factual considerations
that further restricted the Cort implication doctrine." First, judicial in-
ference of a private right is likely if the statute's primary focus is
retrospective rather than prospective. 8 Second, the existence of express
causes of action within the relevant statute creates an inference against
finding an implied remedy. 9 Third, the Court rarely will construe a
remedy covering the same conduct that an express remedy proscribes in
another section of the statute." Fourth, the Court should not inquire into
policy reasons for or against inference of a private remedy because the
critical inquiry concerns congressional intent.' Finally, the absence of
lower court holdings implying causes of action under the given statute
may hinder the Supreme Court in finding that a private remedy exists.2
The Supreme Court completed the retreat from the liberal federal
doctrine of implication to effectuate statutory purpose, and continued
the trend toward the statutory construction approach in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis. 3 The Transamerica Court
clearly stated that the ultimate question is whether Congress intended
to create the private remedy asserted." The Court applied the general
guidelines established in Redington to conclude that the antifraud sec-
tion of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 created only a limited
private remedy. 5 The Transamerica Court initially analyzed the
plaintiff rights or prohibited the disputed conduct. See Steinberg, supra note 27, at 42-43.
The initial Redington inquiry is startlingly similar to the Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby im-
plication theory. 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). Rigsby allowed the inference of remedies based
on the old maxim of "where there is a right, there is a remedy." Id. Redington, however, re-
quires the satisfaction of the fourth Cort principle in addition to the intent inquiry. 442 U.S.
at 575-76; see text accompanying notes 13-21 supra (discussion of Cort principles).
', '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 174.
442 U.S. at 570-71. In Redington, the Court indicated that if the primary focus of a
statute is to prevent or inhibit future harm, a court will not construe an implied private
remedy. Id. If, on the other hand, the statute provides recompense for a past violation, a
court will be amenable to an inference of a private remedy. Steinberg, supra note 27, at 43.
The Redington Court found that § 17(a) of the '34 Act is a prospective statute that seeks to
forestall insolvency, rather than provide recompense. 442 U.S. at 570-71.
" 442 U.S. at 572. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975)
(Congress knows how to provide private remedies for damages, and did so expressly). But
see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979) (provision of express remedies
does not foreclose judicial inference of additional remedies).
6 442 U.S. at 574. The Redington Court stated that when the legislature creates a
right without a remedy contemporaneously with the creation of express remedies for the
same conduct elsewhere in the statute, the Court is extremely reluctant to broaden the pro-
vided remedy. Id.
", Id. at 575; see text accompanying notes 40-45 supra (discussing Cannon dissenter's
judicial legislating concerns).
62 442 U.S. at 577-78 n.19; see Steinberg, supra note 27, at 43-44.
444 U.S. 11 (1979); see Private Causes of Action, supra note 10, at 279-85 (ramifica-
tions of Transamerica decision on judicial power to infer private remedies).
" 444 U.S. at 15; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (ultimate
question one of congressional intent).
65 444 U.S. at 24.
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statutory language to determine whether the statute granted rights to
an identifiable class or proscribed certain activities.66 The Court deter-
mined that the statute created enforceable fiduciary obligations. 7 The
Court subsequently sought to determine whether Congress intended en-
forcement of the statutory rights through private litigation.68 The Court
reiterated the Cannon position that the absence of express congressional
consideration of a private remedy is not inconsistent with the finding of
an implied private remedy. 9 The Court stated, however, that where a
statute expressly provides a remedy for the particular proscribed con-
duct, a court must be "chary" of engrafting other remedies onto the
statute.0 Because the statute in question contained express authoriza-
tion for certain private actions, the Court concluded that Congress was
unwilling to allow private enforcement of statutory sections not expressly
creating private causes of action.7'
The Transamerica Court heavily relied upon an elemental principle
of statutory construction in finding that Congress did not intend to
create a private remedy in the Investment Advisers Act's antifraud sec-
tion." The Court concluded that the mere existence of express private
remedies in other sections of the statute indicates congressional intent
not to create an implied private remedy under the antifraud section.73
The inference of congressional intent from the presence of express
remedies results from the ancient maxim of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."4 The effect of the expressio principle is that when legislation
expressly provides a remedy, a court should not expand the coverage of
the statute to include other remedies.75 The Redington Court interpreted
the expressio maxim as foreclosing inference of a remedy only when an
express remedy is directed at essentially the same type of misconduct as
Id. at 16-17.
"Id. at 17.
Id. at 18, 24.
88 Id. at 18; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
70 444 U.S. at 19-20.
" Id. at 20-21. The Transamerica Court found that the absence of express private
remedies in the Investment Advisers Act indicated that Congress did not intend to allow
private suits. Id. at 21. The Court examined the remedies provided by earlier securities
laws along with companion legislation to conclude that if Congress had meant to create a
private remedy, the statute would have contained an express private remedy. Id. at 20-21.
The Court did not restrict itself to an examination of the Investment Advisers Act. Id. The
Court examined a variety of other legislation to ascertain congressional intent. Id.
Id. at 19-21.
,' Id. at 19.
" National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 452,
458 (1974). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the expression of one thing is
the ekclusion of the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). The specification of
certain persons or things in a law, contract, or will creates the inference of an intention to
exclude all others from its operation. Id.
," National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.,Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974); see note 12 supra.
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the implied remedy." The Redington interpretation of the expressio
maxim permitted the inference of remedies that did not expand the
scope of the express remedies in the statute." Transamerica, however,
requires a stricter interpretation of the expressio principle which
severely limits the federal implication doctrine. In effect, the Tran-
samerica Court held that when persuasive legislative intent to the con-
trary is absent and a statute contains express remedies, Congress in-
tended those express remedies to be exclusive.
79
The most recent Supreme Court implication cases follow the Trans-
america and Redington approach of analyzing congressional intent." In
Universities Research Association, Inc. v. Coutu,8" The Court reiterated
that the primary question is one of congressional intent, not whether a
court can improve upon the express statutory scheme.82 The Supreme
Court relied on the three Cort factors emphasized in Redington to deter-
mine legislative intent.83 From examination of the language and the focus
of the Davis-Bacon Act, the legislative history, and its purpose, the
Court determined that Congress did not intend to create a private
remedy. 4 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the statutory protec-
tion of a specified class that includes the plaintiff does not mandate a find-
ing of an implied remedy.85 The Court found little reason for inference of
a private remedy when a statute contains only a general prohibitory
structure.8 On the other hand, the Coutu Court noted that the Court con-
sistently infers a cause of action where the statutory language explicitly
confers a right on a class of which plaintiff is a member. 7
In another recent implication case, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union of America88 the Supreme Court indicated
that all of the four Cort factors are relevant to the determination of
"' Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574 (1979); see '33 Act after Naftalin
and Redington, supra note 6, at 175-77.
17 See '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 178 (outlining § 17(a)
remedy narrower than express remedies of '33 Act).
7' See Private Causes of Action, supra note 10, at 284-85.
See Implied Rights of Action, supra note 10, at 1167.
See text accompanying notes 48-79 supra.
81 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
82 Id. at 770.
8 Id.
Id.; see 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976).
85 450 U.S. at 771; see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 17-18 (1979) (once court finds specific statutory right, court must determine whether
Congress intended to create private remedy).
8 450 U.S. at 772. Section 1 of the Davis-Bacon Act requires certain federal construc-
tion contract benefits for mechanics and laborers, but does not confer rights directly on
those individuals. Id.; see 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976). The statutory language provides no sup-
port for the inference of a private remedy. 450 U.S. at 773; see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
87 450 U.S. at 771-72; see note 56 supra.
451 U.S. 77 (1981).
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whether Congress intended to create a private remedy. 9 The Court ex-
amined the structure, language and legislative history of the relevant
statutes to find that Congress did not intend to create a remedy for the
plaintiff. 0 The Court emphasized that Congress did not provide express
rights or especial statutory consideration to'individuals in the plaintiffs
position.9 Thus, the Court concluded that the comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme of the statutes evidenced a congressional intent not to
authorize additional remedies.2 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
legislative history provided no support for inference of a private
remedy. 3 Finally, the Court distinguished between judicial interpreta-
tion of a statute and the exercise of judicial power to create a remedy. 4
The Court stated that judicial power to interpret statutes is limited to
the determination of congressional intent. Similarly, the Court in-
dicated that the fashioning of remedies is not an open-ended judicial
power. 6 In the absence of legislation, the Court can create a remedy only
in cases involving uniquely federal issues. 7
The Supreme Court's most recent implication decision, California v.
Sierra Club,98 emphasized the importance of the first two Cort principles
in the determination of legislative intent.9 The Court indicated that a
negative finding on the first two Cort factors obviates the need for con-
tinued analysis.' The Court maintained that a court should not engraft
a remedy that fulfills the purpose of a statute unless the first two Cort
factors indicate a congressional intent to create a private remedy.' The
69 Id. at 91.
Id. at 91-92.
" Id. at 92.
Id. at 93-94.
" Id. at 94-95.
9, Id. A notable aspect of the Northwest Airlines decision was the Court's recognition
of the common law judicial power to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct. Id.
at 90, 95. Although the Court refused to fashion a new remedy that might alter the carefully
balanced legislative scheme, the Court gave limited support to the old pre-Cort common law
method of judicial inference of remedies. Id. at 95-96. The pre-Cort inference cases recognized
a judicial power to create remedies in favor of individuals injured by violations of federal
statutes. See note 11 supra.
,5 451 U.S. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-11 (1980), the Supreme Court construed 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) as authorizing private suits to redress violations by state officials of
rights created by federal statutes. Section 1983 provides that every person who deprives
another, under color of any statute, of rights secured by the Constitution or laws is liable to
the injured party in an action at law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Thiboutot Court found
that § 1983 suits are not limited to the violation of constitutional rights. 448 U.S. at 4. Sec-
tion 1983 thus provides an alternative remedial avenue in addition to the judicial inference
of private remedies.
9 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
" Id. at 293-94.
'® Id. at 497-98; see text accompanying notes 13-21 supra (discussion of Cort factors).
101 451 U.S. at 297.
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Sierra Club Court interpreted the first Cort inquiry as not simply a
determination of who benefits from the relevant statute, but rather an
investigation into whether Congress intended to confer federal rights
upon the statutory beneficiaries." 2 The Court found that the statute pro-
scribed certain activities to benefit the public in general and could not
support any inference of congressional intent to confer rights on the
plaintiff."3 Similarly, the Court found that legislative history foreclosed
the finding of a private remedy.0 4 The Court indicated that congres-
sional silence with respect to remedies confirmed the absence of con-
gressional concern for the protection of private rights."5 Failure of the
first half of the Cort test negated the need for consideration of the sec-
ond two Cort factors.
00
The dramatic, confusing and occasionally contradictory evolution of
the current restrictive federal inference policy has resulted in inconsis-
tent lower court decisions over whether section 17(a) of the '33 Act im-
plies a private right of action. 7 Lower federal courts have developed
alternative approaches to the question of whether section 17(a) implies a
private remedy.0 0 The alternative analytical approaches conflict with
102 Id. at 294. The Sierra Club Court commented that the victim of a crime is not
necessarily the especial beneficiary of a criminal statute. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
... Id. at 296. The Sierra Club Court indicated for the first time that congressional
silence concerning remedies could support a finding of no intent to create a private cause of
action. Id. Earlier inference decisions recognized that ambiguous or silent legislative history
is not inconsistent with the finding of an implied private remedy. See, e.g., Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
"o 451 U.S. at 297; see text accompanying notes 13-21 supra (Cort discussion).
" Compare Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,249, 91,631-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (private right of action implied under § 17(a)); Kirshner v.
United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979);
Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1977) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); and Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir.
1975) (same) with Schull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977)
(private right of action not implied), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); and Ingram Indus.,
Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060, 1069 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (same).
100 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,249, 91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on minimal difference between §§ 17(a) and 10(b));
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing, 650 F.2d 342, 352 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (altering implication inquiry to whether Congress intended to deny, rather than
create, private remedy), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3098 (1981); Kirshner v. United States, 603
F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (relying on broad language of § 17(a)), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909
(1979); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth [1981] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,267, 91,717
(W.D.N.Y. 1981) (inferring § 17(a) private remedy based on similarities between § 17(a) and §
10(b) of '34 Act rather than Cort factors); Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for
Daily Income, Inc. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,254, 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on
Kirshner); Note, Section 17(a) of the '38 Act. Defining the Scope of Antifraud Protection, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 859, 866 n.57 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Scope of Antifraud Protec-
tion] (suggesting differing approaches to inference of § 17(a) private remedy).
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the recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the inference of private
causes of action." 9 Some lower courts have adopted an approach that in-
volves the fashioning of a private remedy in order to assist in the en-
forcement of the '33 Act."0 The courts reason that an implied remedy
provides a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement activities and
helps effectuate the deterrence purpose of the statute.' The enforce-
ment provisions of the '33 Act do not provide private remedies for all
possible violations of section 17(a).11'2 Furthermore, because of the huge
number of pursuable cases, the SEC cannot enforce all violations of the
securities acts. Therefore, some lower courts have concluded that the
deterrence of fraud in securities transactions requires the inference of a
section 17(a) private remedy."'
The Supreme Court, however, currently rejects the proposition that
the judiciary has the power to create remedies to improve the statutory
enforcement scheme.' Furthermore, the inference of a remedy under
section 17(a) conflicts with the strict expressio maxim emphasized in
Transamerica."' The Redington and Transamerica decisions stress the
impropriety of conferring a remedy against contrary congressional in-
tent." Therefore, the existence of express remedies in the '33 Act
should foreclose the inference of a section 17(a) private remedy. "7
An alternative analytical approach used by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia indicated that the proper implication inquiry is
1 See text accompanying notes 110-185 infra.
10 See Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1288 (D. Kansas 1980) (suggesting that lack of any § 17(a) remedies may allow inference of
private right of action); Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Alaska 1979)
(private cause of action under § 17(a)(3) clearly would assist enforcement of SEC rules). But
see Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42, 47 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (denying inference of § 17(a)
remedy because inferred remedy would allow circumvention of express civil remedies of
Securities Acts).
"' See Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1288 (D. Kansas 1980); Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Alaska 1979);
note 11 supra (Borak decision allowed inference of remedy to facilitate SEC enforcement of
statute).
"' See notes 3-6 supra.
... See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964) (Supreme Court created "private
attorney's general" to effectuate statutory purpose and aid SEC enforcement); note 11
supra.
" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); text ac-
companying notes 80-105 supra (discussion of most recent Supreme Court implication cases).
"I Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979); see Private
Causes of Action, supra note 10, at 283-84 (expressio maxim leaves almost no room for
recognition of implied rights of action); text accompanying notes 72-79 supra (discussing ex-
pressio maxim).
"' Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
"' See Hill v. Der, [1981] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,311, 91,947 (D. Del. 1981). In Hill,
the court declined to infer a § 17(a) private remedy. Id. The court noted that the existing
temedial provisions foreclosed the finding of an implied remedy. Id. The court mentioned
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not whether Congress intended to imply a private right of action, but
whether Congress denied a private remedy.118 The court found that since
the legislative history expressly did not negative inference of a remedy,
consideration of the third Cort factor was appropriate."' The court con-
cluded that a private remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the ac-
complishment of the statutory purposes and thus found an implied
private remedy. 2 ' In addition, the circuit court proceeded to interpret
the expressio principle very narrowly. 2' The court indicated that the ex-
istence of an express remedy does not alleviate the need for implied
remedies in other sections of the statute.2 ' The court further stated that
the legislative process militates against the likelihood of a complete self-
contained statute.2 The Court concluded, therefore, that the expressio
maxim prevented the inference of remedies only if the implied remedies
would nullify the express remedies.
The District of Columbia Circuit's approach is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's Redington and Transamerica decisions, which clearly
indicate that the proper inquiry is whether Congress intended to create
a private remedy. 25 Furthermore, the expressio maxim creates a
presumption against finding an implied private remedy that yields only
to persuasive evidence of legislative intent to create a private remedy.2"
The circuit court, in effect, adopted a presumption in favor of the judicial
inference of an implied remedy. The Transamerica decision clearly in-
dicates that whenever a statute contains express remedies a court must
the unlikelihood of Congress' absentmindedly omitting an intended private remedy. Id. The
court also noted the similarities between § 17(a) of the '33 Act and § 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act for which the Transamerica Court denied the existence of a private remedy.
Id.; see 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). The Hill Court employed the Transamerica analysis to find
that the existence of express civil remedies in §§ 11 and 12 as well as the criminal penalties
and injunctive relief available for § 17(a) violations prohibited the inference of a private
remedy. Id.
.. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing, 650 F.2d 342, 352
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3098 (1981).
I1I Id.
' Id. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing, the court applied
the third Cort factor in indicating that a private remedy would effectuate the broad pur-
poses of the Act. Id.; see text accompanying note 19 supra (third Cort factor). A proper Cort
analysis requires a court to determine whether the inferred remedy is consistent with the
primary purpose of a statute. Implied Rights of Action, supra note 10, at 1159.
121 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing, 650 F.2d 342, 352-53
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3098 (1981).
11 Id. at 354-55.
I23 Id.
12 Id. at 355-56.
11 See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 578 (1979).
1" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); text
accompanying notes 72-79 supra.
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be "chary" of creating other remedies.'" In addition, the recent Supreme
Court cases concerning inference of private remedies uniformly reject
judicial extrapolation of congressional intent from the legislative pro-
cess or consideration of the need for additional private remedies."
Therefore, the District of Columbia Circuit improperly analyzed the con-
gressional intent question and mistakenly limited the expressio doctrine.
Several courts have suggested that the judicial activism existing at
the time of enactment of the statute is a factor courts should consider in
an implied private cause of action analysis. 2 9 The underlying rationale
for the approach is that courts liberally inferred private rights of action
prior to the Cort decision.30 A pre-Cort Congress may have relied on the
judiciary to fashion a remedy, rather than enacting aT express remedy.' 3'
The Supreme Court's current implication theory allows past judicial ac-
tivism to influence the findings of a remedy only in the face of proof of
legislative reliance on judicial activism.2 The modified Cort test em-
phasizes the importance of congressional intent.3 The modified" Cort
test, however, does not allow the presumption of congressional intent
from past judicial tendencies.'34 Judicial activism does not rise to the
level of a "canon of statutory construction," as does the expressio maxim,
from which a court can imply statutory intent.'35 The Supreme Court re-
quires that the foundation of the inference of private remedies be on cur-
rent judicial standards rather than the assumed effects of past trends.
38
", Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
' See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (not
within federal judiciary's competence to amend congressionally authorized comprehensive
enforcement schemes); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (question is
one of congressional intent, not whether Court can improve statutory scheme); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740, 745-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (inference of
private remedies is judicial legislation violative of separation of powers).
" See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 317 (2d Cir. 1980), affd sub nom, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457 (1982); Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co.,
634 F.2d 774, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 876-77 (D.N.J.
1980).
,o See note 11 supra.
' See Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); Navigator Group
Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. 487 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
S3 ee Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (focus of inquiry is
determination of legislative intent).
" See text accompanying notes 48-56, 64-76 & 82 supra.
" See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710-11 (1979) (indicating that
Court should not presume congressional intent to create private remedy from past judicial
activism in finding implied causes of action).
", See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
, California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 301 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Court
should adhere to intent analysis rather than base decision on opinion of what Congress prob-
ably assumed at time of legislation); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, 50 U.S.L.W. 4457, 4464 (1982). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that the congressional intent at the time of enact-
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Several federal court decisions have found a section 17(a) implied
private right of action under a variety of analytical approaches premised
on the similarities between section 17(a) of the '33 Act and section 10(b)
of the '34 Act."7 Cases relying on the parallels between section 10(b), rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and section 17(a) emphasize the nearly
identical language of the two sections, the similar purposes behind the
'33 and '34 securities acts, and judicial findings of private causes of ac-
tion under section 10(b).'38 One line of cases proceeded under the assump-
ment of a statute determines the existence of a private remedy. Id. The Court indicated
that a determination of'congressional intent requires an examination of the contemporary
legal context in which Congress enacted a given bill. Id. In Curran, the Court recognized
that amendment of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) in 1974 occurred with congres-
sional understanding that courts previously had recognized an implied private remedy
under the CEA. Id.; see Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the CEA amendments and found
that Congress intended to adopt a private remedy. Id. The Court did not speculate on the in-
tent of Congress in light of the judicial implication doctrine at the time of the amendments.
See text accompanying notes 129-134 supra. The Court examined proof of legislative
reliance on judicial activism and found clear congressional intent to adopt a private remedy.
See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4463-64.
1"7 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,249, 91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (section 17(a) private remedy because of minimal differences
between § 17(a) and § 10(b) which has implied private remedy); Kirshner v. United States,
603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (once aggrieved buyer has established § 10(b) cause of action,
he acquires § 17(a) private cause of action since language of § 17(a) broad enough to imply
private right of action), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977) (similarities between § 17(a) and § 10(b) re-
quire finding of implied private remedy under § 17(a)), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551
(1979); Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,267, 91,717
(W.D.N.Y. 1981) (inferring § 17(a) private right of action based on impracticability of deny-
ing private action under § 17(a) once plaintiff has established § 10(b) cause of action and ex-
istence of § 10(b) implied remedy); Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daily In-
come, Inc. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,254, 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (inferring § 17(a)
remedy based on Kirshner).
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act provides that it shall be unlawful:
(b) To use or employ, in connection vith the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); see note 3 supra (text of § 17(a)).
13 See Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,249,
91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (minimal differences between §§ 17(a) and 10(b)); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v.
Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979) ('33 and '34 Acts share same purpose and courts
should consider two acts together as one body of law). Courts consistently have found an im-
plied private cause of action under § 10(b) of '34 Act. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689
(1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2"d
1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); note 144 infra. Sec-
tions 10(b) and 17(a) address the very similar concerns of the protection of the public from
fraudulent practices in the securities market. See notes 2 and 137 supra. The language of
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tion that the antifraud sections of the '33 and '34 Acts are identical.13
Since courts consistently infer a section 10(b) private remedy, 14 the
reasoning follows that courts should infer a section 17(a) private right of
action. Furthermore, courts have relied on the broad language of section
17(a) to support inference of a private remedy. 41 A court may conclude
that the relatively narrow scope of the '33 Act's enforcement provisions
and the broad prohibitory language of section 17(a) evidence congres-
sional intent to imply a private remedy.14' Another line of decisions find-
ing implied remedies relies upon Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.'4 3 in which he asserted the impracticability
of denying the existence of a private action under section 17(a) once the
plaintiff establishes a section 10(b) cause of action alleging fraud.
4 4
the two sections is similar, and rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b), is an almost verbatim
copy of § 17(a). Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 with note 3 (text of § 17(a)).
"I See Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,249,
91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying onKirshner analysis and minimal § 10(b) and § 17(a) differences);
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (relying on broad § 17(a) language
and Daniel), cert denied, 441 U.S. 995 (1979); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977) (operative provisions of '33 and '34 Acts' antifraud sections
are identical for purposes of lawsuit), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Automatic
Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daily Income, Inc. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,254, 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on Kirshner).
"I1 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 577 n.19 (1979) (recognizing longstanding history of lower court influence of private
causes of action under § 10(b) of '34 Act); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (acquiescing in 25 year lower court practice of finding implied
remedies under § 10(b) of '34 Act).
... See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
909 (1979); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). See also Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (broad language of statute allows inference of implied remedy to protect
statutory right).
.' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573 (1979). The Redington Court
rejected the argument that Congress intended to imply a remedy because the express
remedy gave redress to only a limited class. Id. The Court rejected this argument on two
grounds. Id. at 573-74. First, legislative history supported the view that Congress intended
the express remedy to be the exclusive remedy. Id. Second, the Court indicated that when
the express remedy is limited in scope and Congress created the violated section contem-
poraneously with the express remedy, the Court should not decide whether Congress in-
tended the express remedy to be exclusive. Id. at 574. The Court is extremely reluctant to
infer a remedy that broadens the express remedy of a statute. Id. When a statutory provis-
ion has a limited scope and a contemporaneously created remedy the Court assumes that an
inferred remedy would expand the scope of an express remedy. Id.
1a 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring en banc), cert. denied sub nom,
Coates v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1005 (1969), rehearing den., 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
' Id. at 867. Judge Friendly's Texas Gulf Sulphur concurring opinion examines the
similarities between § 10b of the '34 Act, rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and § 17(a) of
the '33 Act. Id. Judge Friendly noted that paragraphs one and three of § 17(a) are clearly
within the civil liability scope of § 10(b). Id. Paragraph two of § 17(a), on the other hand, is
unique to both the '33 and '34 Acts in that § 17(a)(2) imposes liability for damages caused by
negligent misrepresentation without restrictions as to kinds of plaintiffs, due diligence
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Several courts have expanded the impracticability approach by allowing




Several important distinctions force the failure of the comparison
between section 17(a) of the '33 Act and section 10(b) of the '34 Act as the
basis for the inference of a section 17(a) private remedy. Although sec-
tions 17(a) and 10(b) are the respective antifraud provisions of the '33 and
'34 Acts, the two provisions are not identical. 4 The '33 Act is a more
narrow statute that deals only with the fraudulent activities of a limited
range of individuals in the offer or sale of securities.'47 The '34 Act en-
compasses negligence in any way connected with the purchase or sale of
securities.148 Furthermore, the '33 Act provides remedies for violations
of its substantive provisions under sections 11 and 12. 14 The '33 statute
provides a logical, well-balanced enforcement scheme that may not pro-
vide a remedy for every claimant, but allows enforcement of each of the
specifically prohibited activities.' The 1934 Act, on the other hand, has
very limited enforcement provisions that do not embrace all the ac-
tivities the Act prohibits."5 ' Thus, the same justification for implication
of a remedy under the '33 Act does not apply to the '34 Act.' 2 Additionally,
courts incorrectly interpret Judge Friendly's comments in Texas Gulf
Sulphur as a holding in favor of a section 17(a) implied right of action.'3
defenses, or a short statute of limitations. Id. Judge Friendly indicated, however, that com-
mentators strongly disfavored the existence of either a § 17(a) or § 17(a)(2) private remedy
as a supplement to § 11 and § 12 remedies. Id. Judge Friendly concluded the analysis by
pointing out that once the plaintiff establishes a § 10(b) action there is little sense in denying
a § 17(a) action provided the plaintiff alleges fraud rather than mere negligence. Id. To allow
a § 17(a) remedy in the absence of a § 10(b) cause of action for fraud undermines the carefully
framed limitations imposed on buyers by §§ 11 and 12. Id. at 867-68.
"' See Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Alaska 1979) (implied
right of action under § 17(a)(3), but not §§ 17(a)(1) or 17(a)(2) independent of 10(b) remedy);
Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 64 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (section 17(a)
private remedy independent of § 10(b) remedy); DeMarco v. Security Planning Serv., Inc.,
462 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D. Ariz. 1978) (same).
". See notes 3-6, 137 & 138 supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); see Loss, supra note 5, at 1785-86.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
"' See notes 5 & 6 supra.
15 Loss, supra note 5, at 1785.
"' Id. Section 17(a) of the '33 Act and § 10(b) of the '34 Act are markedly different in en-
forcement capabilities. Id. The '34 Act creates remedies under §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), & 78r (1976). The enforcement provisions of the '34 Act do not supply
remedies for the multifarious substantive rights created by the Act. See Loss, supra note 5,
at 1785. Section 9(e) provides a remedy only for illegal manipulation of security prices. 15
U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). Section 16(b) allows recovery only of profit earned from the unfair use
of insider information. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Finally, § 18 allows a court to grant
damages for a purchaser's reliance on a false or misleading statement, subject, however, to
a good faith defense. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
,52 Loss, supra note 5, at 1785.
" See Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,249,
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Judge Friendly's comments were merely a judicial aside found in an opin-
ion denying the inference of a private cause of action under section
17(a).1- Therefore, inference of a section 17(a) remedy based upon a com-
parison with the '34 Act's antifraud provision ignores important dif-
ferences in scope and purpose between the two Acts.
Finally, one commentator has indicated that the recent Supreme
Court decision of United States v. Naftalin15 may allow the finding of an
implied section 17(a) private remedy.'58 Prior to Naftalin, the antifraud
protection of section 17(a) did not extend to agents of purchasers.157 The
Naftalin Court found that Congress enacted section 17(a) for the protec-
tion of investors and the enforcement of ethical business practices.'58 Ac-
cordingly, the Court expanded the reach of section 17(a) by increasing
the class of persons entitled to antifraud protection and by applying sec-
tion 17(a) to fraud in the aftermarket."'5 One commentator argues that
91,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (indicating Friendly's Texas Gulf Sulphur reasoning persuasive in fin-
ding existence of § 17(a) private right of action); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241
(2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth,
[1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,267, 91,717 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on Kirshner and
Texas Gulf Sulphur to allow inference of § 17(a) private remedy); Dyer v. Eastern Trust &
Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 904 (D. Me. 1971) (relying on Friendly's concurrence).
'1 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring en banc), cert. denied sub nor., Coates v. SEC, 404 U.S. 1005 (1969), rehearing
den., 404 U.S. 1064 (1972); L. Loss, 6 SECURITIES REGULATION 3913 (Supp. to 2d ed. Vol. HI
1969) [hereinafter cited as SECURITIES]. Judge Friendly indicated that a court should not
deny a § 17(a) remedy once the plaintiff establishes a § 10(b) claim alleging fraud rather than
mere negligence. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1969), rehearing den., 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Thus, Judge Friendly clearly did not intefid to indicate that a § 17(a) private cause of action
is available whenever the plaintiff proves a § 10(b) cause of action. See id. To allow a § 17(a)
remedy in the absence of fraud vould undermine the carefully framed limitations imposed
on the buyer's right to recover granted by § 12(2) of the '33 Act. Id.; see SECURITIES, supra,
at 3913. Friendly's decision, however, clearly does not support the inference of a § 17(a)
remedy in the absence of a § 10(b) claim. See 401 F.2d at 867. Friendly's concurrence cannot
support the finding of an implied § 17(a) private remedy. See id.
441 U.S. 768 (1979).
" See '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 179.
,57 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); see Scope of AntifraudProtection, supra note 108, at 860-61
(section 17(a) does not cover persons acting as agents for purchasers).
15 United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). Naftalin involved a criminal prose-
cution of a violation of § 17(a)(1) of the '33 Act. Id. at 770; see 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976) (section
24 of '33 Act provides criminal sanctions for willful violations of any '33 Act provision). The
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that § 17(a) protects brokers as well as investors
from fraud in the offer or sale of securities. 441 U.S. at 771-72; see United States v. Naftalin,
579 F.2d 444, 445 (8th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, the Court concluded that § 17(a) applies to
the offer and sale of securities regardless of whether the sale is an initial offering or in
aftermarket trading. 441 U.S. at 777-78; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Scope of Antifraud
Protection, supra note 108, at 860-64.
'59 Scope of Antifraud Protection, supra note 108, at 865. Aftermarket trading refers to
ordinary market trading after the initial public offering of a security. Id. at 862 n.24. Several
commentators limit the scope of § 17(a) to frauds occurring in the initial public offering of
the security. See, e.g., Hazen, A Look beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5; Implied Remedies
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the Naftalin Court's recognition of a broad congressional intent to deter
fraud in the securities markets and to protect a wide group of investors
requires the inference of a section 17(a) private remedy. 6 ' Furthermore,
an expansive reading of Redington yields the interpretation of the ex-
pressio principle that a court may not engraft onto a statute a cause of
action that is significantly broader than the express remedy provided by
Congress.'61 The Redington Court indicated that a court should neither
expand the scope of express remedies nor fashion a remedy for conduct
that is addressed by an existing remedy. 2 Under an expansive ex-
pressio approach, a court may infer, after finding the proper congres-
sional intent, a section 17(a) remedy that does not increase the remedial
limitations of section 12(2.163 Therefore, a court could allow a section
17(a) remedy for conduct that is more culpable and more narrow than the
conduct prohibited by the section 12(2) express remedy.'64 Thus, accor-
ding to the argument, the finding of congressional intent and the con-
struction of a remedy within the scope of existing remedies may permit
the finding of a private cause of action.
Inference of a private remedy under the Naftalin approach ignores
the Supreme Court's guidelines in finding congressional intent. The
mere fact that Congress enacted a statute protecting a certain class does
not necessarily mean that Congress intended enforcement through
private litigation. 6' A showing of congressional intent to create a
remedy is necessary for judicial inference of a private remedy.'66 The
legislative history surrounding section 17(a) shows no congressional in-
tent to create a private remedy."7 In the absence of relevant legislative
and Section 17(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641, 645, 657-58 (1978);
Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 246 (1959); Note, Nonpurchaser Plaintiff Given Standing To Bring
An Action Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Another Threat to the Birn-
baum Doctrine, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 912, 921-22 (1978).
'33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 178.
161 Id.; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574, 577-78 (1979); text accom-
panying notes 48-62 supra (Redington discussion).
162 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572-74 (1979).
Id. at 574, 577-78.
1 See '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 179.
1 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574, 577-78 (1979). In Redington,
the Supreme Court indicated that the Court is extremely reluctant to infer a cause of action
that is significantly broader than the remedy Congress chose to provide. Id. at 574. The
Court modified its stance by stating that the remedial purposes of a statute will not justify
reading a statutory provision more broadly than the language and statutory scheme permit.
Id. at 578. The Court would not read the Securities Acts so that every provision gives rise
to an implied private cause of action. Id. at 577.
18 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981); Hill
v. Der, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98, 311, 91,946 (D. Del. 1981).
"'7 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-10 (1933) (since §§ 11 and 12 create civil
remedies for violation of duties imposed by Act, imposition of greater responsibility would
unnecessarily restrain conscientious administration of honest business with no compen-
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history, the Court examines statutory structure to determine whether
Congress intended a private remedy. 6 ' The Naftalin approach argues
that the expressio maxim allows the inference of remedies more narrow
than the express remedies.169 The clear meaning of the Transamerica and
Coutu cases, which are subsequent to Redington, prevents a broad
reading of the expressio doctrine."' The Court presumes congressional
intent not to create a private remedy from the existence of express
remedies.1 7 1 Therefore, the existence of the section 12(2) remedies blocks
a private remedy under section 17(a). 7 Furthermore, the marked dif-
ferences between sections 12(2) and 17(a) foreclose the finding of any im-
plied private remedy even with a broad expressio doctrine. Differences
between sections 17(a) and 12(2) include the scope of the sections, re-
quirements of privity for liability, and burdens of proof.73 Inference of a
section 17(a) remedy narrower than section 12(2) would require a court to
engage in the type of judicial legislation Justice Powell decried in his
Cannon dissentY.4 A court clearly cannot impose a new remedy on a
legislative scheme based on judicial initiative to supplement the
sating advantage to public); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 650-53 (N.D.
Cal. 1980) (same); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42, 45 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (same).
'" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (congres-
sional intent may appear implicitly in language or structure of statute).
... See text accompanying notes 161-164 supra.
"I Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981); Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 572 (1979); see text accompanying notes 72-79 supra (expressio maxim discussion).
. See text accompanying notes 72-79 supra.
" See McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (court can
presume Congress considered merit of private remedies for violations of Act, and court can-
not use language of § 17 to extend liability to others or circumvent existing procedural
limitations).
,,' '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 179. Section 12(2) requires
privity and imposes liability for negligence. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Section 17(a) requires
no privity, and a court can impose liability only for intentional or reckless misconduct. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at 179. Liability
for negligent misconduct would broaden the § 12(2) remedy contrary to Redington. 442 U.S.
560, 577-78; see Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (sec-
tion 17(a) negligence action would circumvent express civil remedies of '33 Act). Further-
more, under § 12(2) the defendant has the burden of proving reasonable care, while under §
17(a), the plaintiff must prove defendant's negligence. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2) & 77q(a) (1976).
Finally, § 17(a) applies to both after market trading and initial distribution. 15 U.S.C. §§
771(2) & 77a(2) (1976). The broader coverage of § 17(a)'s and § 12(2)'s privity requirement
could allow an offeree to bring suit under § 17(a) even if a § 12(2) remedy is foreclosed
because of the absence of privity. See '33 Act after Naftalin and Redington, supra note 6, at
179-80. See also Douglas, supra note 2, at 181 (section 17(a) probably does not enlarge civil
remedies available in '33 Act since §§ 11 and 12 expressly state available remedies); Horton,
supra note 2, at 46 n.6 (elaborate scheme of express private remedies lends considerable
force to argument that congress explicitly rejected private remedies for violations of § 17).
17' 441 U.S. at 745-49 (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 43 supra.
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remedial scheme of the statute."ls The Naftalin approach would require
such judicial legislation.
17
The conflicting lower court decisions concerning section 17(a) im-
plied remedies result from the absence of a Supreme Court decision on
the issue.17  The Supreme Court's recent trend away from the pre-Cort
principles favoring strong judicial powers to create common law
remedies severely restricts the finding of implied private causes of ac-
tion.178 Recent cases concerning the inference of a section 17(a) private
remedy have disregarded and misapplied the Court's modified Cort
test.179 Application of the modified Cort test clearly indicates that courts
should not construe a section 17(a) private remedy for the protection of
defrauded investors. 8° The section does give rights to a specified class of
individuals."' In addition, no evidence exists of congressional intent to
create a private remedy. 8' The scant legislative history available concern-
ing section 17(a) indicates that Congress intended sections 11 and 12 as
'7' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
1" See note 174 supra.
,7 See note 8 supra.
178 See note 10 supra.
179 See text accompanying notes 107-174 supra.
... See Hill v. Der, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP..(CCH) 98,311, 91,496 (D. Del. 1981). Hill in-
dicates that Congress designed § 17(a) to protect the victims of fraud in the offer or sale of
securities and thus to benefit a particular class. Id. 91,496-97; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
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the exclusive enforcement provisions of the '33 Act.'' Furthermore, the
expressio maxim creates the presumption that Congress would have
created express remedies had it intended to create a section 17(a)
remedy.'84 The Transamerica Court used a similar analysis in finding
that an antifraud provision remarkably similar to section 17(a) did not
support the finding of an implied private remedy."' Therefore, the re-
cent Supreme Court implication decisions indicate that courts should not
create a section 17(a) private cause of action.
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